The networked economy needs to coalesce around trust, standards, protocols and competition. All are essential ingredients for electronic commerce to thrive and they help reduce the pain and inefficiencies-in essence friction-of connecting. As we connect across individuals, firms, regions and nations, we realize that such connectivity or connectedness makes it hard to protect, shelter, segregate or to bundle products and services. The present and other research demonstrate that these developments enable transparency, innovation, competition, as well as expand boundary-spanning and dynamic behavior of firms. While such connectivity and its competitive forces will foster efficiency and overall economic gains, concurrently we will also encounter disruptive effects on markets and societies. The four articles comprising this Special Issue address these developments and thus they reflect current and central concerns of the field of electronic commerce. Michael Koch's and Kathrin M. Möslein's article, "Identities Management for ECommerce and Collaboration Applications," was recognized as the overall best paper presented at the 2003 Bled Electronic Commerce Conference. The Internet was originally developed on the assumption that a user remains anonymous. Today, however, we live in a world where customers expect high levels of mass customization and personalization requiring more and more services that need to know the user. As in real life, a user will interact with different services hosted by different providers. Currently users have to provide and update information about their identity for each service independently. The authors argue that user-centric global identities management is needed for future ecommerce and collaboration applications, and they present results of their ongoing research.
Introduction
Personalization and community support are increasingly considered to be an important ingredient of successful applications for e-commerce and collaboration.
Personalization
Personalization techniques are used for tailoring information services to the needs of individual users. In marketing, personalization supports one-to-one marketing which should increase the customer share over a lifetime. What used to be possible in the corner shop, since the shopkeeper knew her customers personally, will be even more so in the electronic medium through the storage of profiles and the automatic evaluation on the basis of predefined rules.
Technically, personalization is about selecting or filtering information objects or products for an individual by using information about the individual. Different methods are known for performing this selection. These methods range from content based filtering with rules or vector similarities to automated collaborative filtering (see [28] for more information). Independent of the personalization method the ability to deliver personalization is always based on the acquisition of an electronic representation of the user, a user profile. Depending on the personalization method there are different requirements for this user profile. For content based filtering information about preferred content and Michael Koch, Kathrin Möslein: Identities Management for E-Commerce and Collaboration Applications. International Journal of Electronic Commerce (IJEC), to be published. relationships to content objects has to be stored. For collaborative filtering relationships to other users and explicit ratings or comments have to be managed. 
Community Support
Personalization is not the only reason for services to collect information about their users. More and more often Web-based services offer some kind of community support functionality. Users are not supported independently from each other but are encouraged to contact one another. The services provide support for exchanging information, getting in contact, and communicating with each other.
Three major possibilities are created by bringing communities of people together: (1) the building of trust,
the collection and effective use of (trusted) community information, and (3) the economic impacts of accumulated purchasing power.
The economic impacts of communities for accumulating purchasing power have already been discussed by Hagel and Armstrong [13] . Hagel and Armstrong mainly focus on groups of Internet users that are drawn together around products or companies and use the extended possibilities of the online medium to cooperate and gain advantages they would not have if they were acting as isolated customers (better information, discounts). Such groups are often referred to as virtual communities of transaction [27] . In addition to the accumulation of purchasing power this type of community is a source for valuable data about the products and about the community members. The additional information about the users is often the basis for personalization by making use of techniques such as collaborative filtering, data mining, and personalized user interfaces.
In addition to the use of information about users for personalization, in community support platforms user profiles are also needed for introducing users to each other. In communication, which is the primary activity in communities, knowing the identity of those with whom you communicate is essential for understanding and evaluating an interaction and for building trust [8] . So the community members have to know one another and have a recognition of each others attributes. There is no need to have the user representation linked to the real world identity of the user -but the user representation in the community has to be persistent. Persistent pseudonymous user representations can for example be found in online auction platforms like eBay where reputation information is stored as part of the identities [20] .
In sum, for modern applications user representations have to be available for personalization and for presenting users to each other. In the remainder of this article we will -detail some issues of user representation and identities and highlight the core problems with user representation in e-commerce and collaboration applications (Section 2),
-discuss the concept of (user-centric) "identities management" for handling user representations and for addressing the problems mentioned before (Section 3),
-review existing work to highlight the problem of missing user control in identities management (Section 4), and -present a possible solution for enhanced user control in identities management (Section 5).
In the summary we will finally lay out a work agenda for user representation and identities management in the future (Section 6).
User Representation and Identities

Identity
In the introduction we have used the terms 'user representation', 'user profile' and 'identity' synonymously. Before we continue with the discussion we will now clarify the terms.
The Webster English Dictionary describes the word identity as: "1) the condition or fact of being the same or exactly alike (sameness, oneness); 2a) the condition or fact of being a specific person or thing (individuality); b) the condition of being the same as a person or thing described or claimed" [32] . According to this definition the two important features of identity are 1) the process of verifying that a person is whom they claim to be, and 2) identity as the sum of all information describing a specific person.
In e-commerce applications the aspect of identity in terms of verification of a specific person plays an important role and already has been addressed broadly. For personalization and for collaboration support however, the aspect of identity as all information that describes a specific person is much more important. In this article we therefore will re-gard identity more in the context of a user profile, a set of attributes describing a person or role in the digital world.
Identities and Entities
When looking to the dictionary definition of 'identity' there is a claim for equality or 'one-ness'. A person has one identity. However, this is not true for user representations. A person may use different representations at various times during a life-span, and even maintain several representations at once. Such multiple roles are neither illegal nor used primarily for illegal purposes. Since we want to keep the term 'identity' for user representations we need a new term for the 'real-world identity'. In the literature the term 'entity' is used for this purpose [6] . An 'entity' is any kind of manner or real-world thing, including natural persons. An entity does not necessarily have a single identity, but may have many. An identity is a particular presentation of an entity.
See [3, 4, 6] for a deeper discussion of 'digital persona' and of the differences between entities and identities in the context of (id)entification.
Modeling Identities
When trying to capture identities in data structures different approaches are taken. The most general approach is to model an identity as a set of attribute value pairs. A user profile model provides a schema for what attributes are present in a profile. Figure 1 shows different types of information about a user that can be used for personalization. This information ranges from the name of the user, demographic attributes and the history of past transactions to dynamic attributes like the current position as used in location based personalization.
For coding simple user profile information like address or payment information some standards are available. Examples are the vCard standard [14] or the profile schema included in World Wide Web Consortiums P3P specification [24] . These approaches are mainly based on hierarchically structured sets of attribute value pairs. For more complex information like interests or browsing histories personalization applications currently define proprietary codings based on the application and on the algorithms operating on the information. Some first attempts to standardize codings for the complex information can be found in work from Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Management research. See [10] or [11] for information on abstract modeling of user profiles and on user profile servers.
Acquiring Identities
There are various methods for capturing user representations which engage the user to different degrees. One usually distinguishes asking the user (fill-in-profile, explicit feedback or ratings) from observing the user (click-stream-or transaction-analysis) [28] . While the discussion of these methods is important it does not address some basic issues in user profile acquisition:
(1) Users often do not trust services that collect and use profile information (and therefore try to provide none or false information).
(2) Even if the user cooperates, it is not without effort on their part and there is a time delay until enough information is collected to provide appropriate recommendations. Thus, small or infrequently visited sites do not have a chance to collect a detailed enough user profile.
The second issue is called 'cold-start problem'. This means that users expect good recommendations from the beginning, but the system is only able to provide recommendations after having asked the user a lot of questions or after having watched the user for some time. This issue is of special importance in the field of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).
Identities Management
Managing the availability of information about users for applications is called 'identity management'. Because we are talking about managing several identities for one single user or entity we are more precisely talking about 'identities management'.
Identities management can contribute to solve the two key problems mentioned in the previous section (distrust and cold-start) by -giving control of identity information back to users (to solve the distrust issue), and -allowing the reuse of identity information among the different personalization services (to solve the cold-start problem).
To gain these advantages identities management solutions first have to separate -the usage of identity information (in the personalization or collaboration services), and -the storage of identity information (e.g. in a central user profile or identity server).
This separation of identities usage and identities storage opens the chance of identity reuse and provides a single location where user access control and user awareness (of who is using which information) can be implemented in a way the profile owners trust.
Identities management is something we do in normal conversation everyday when we decide on what to tell one another about ourselves. In interactions with others we consider the situational context and the role we are currently acting in as well as the respective relationship with the communication partners. This consideration results in different sets of information being released to different interaction partners. Sometimes this leads to the situation that a person is known under different names in different contexts, e.g. by using special names, nicknames or pseudonyms suiting the occasion [19] .
In the electronic world an identities management system would allow people to define different identities, roles, associate personal data to it, and decide whom to give data and when to act anonymously. An identities management system would empower the user to maintain their privacy and control their digital identity.
Components of identities management
When looking more closely into identities management, the following tasks can be identified: 1) storing identity data, 2) authenticating identity owners, 3) allowing the identity owners to define access rights for other users, 4) evaluating access rights when answering queries.
From these basic tasks the following main components can be identified for identities management systems:
-directory service (repository): storing information about registered users -authentication: establishing the validity of the identity of a user (linking a user to an identity)
-authorization (policy control): controlling access to user profile information (for other services and other users)
Virtually every service (and device) today holds a directory with information about one or more identities. Most services also have some authentication functionality. The main issue for the future is to reduce this variety to a few directories, or possibly a single directory, and add authorization functionality in a user centric way.
Authorization in identities management can be characterized as defining and enforcing access rights to user profile attributes. Users do not want to share their information with all services, because some services may be more trustworthy to users than others. Requirements for authorization in identities management include flexibility, arbitrary level of detail and granularity, purpose binding of requests, control over sharing and distribution of data, and dependency on the privacy policy of a service.
Federated Identities Management
Identities management currently is a core component of system security environments inside companies where it is used for the maintenance of account information for login access to a system or a limited set of applications. The rise of inter-company collaboration, the need for identity data about customers, and the emergence of web services architectures are driving the need for companies to understand and manage inter-company dependencies. Solutions addressing these issues are centralized Internet wide identities management services or federated identities management networks.
Federated identities management systems provide mechanisms for companies to share identity information between discrete domains. The central attribute of federated identities management systems is that there is no single entity that holds the information about all identities (see Figure 2 ). Federated systems support multiple identity providers and a distributed, partitioned store for identity information. Clear operating rules govern the various participants in a federation -both the operators of components and the operators of services who rely on the information provided by the identities management system. In a federated environment, a user can log on through his identity provider and then leverage that authentication state to easily access resources in external domains. The federation or decentralisation of identities management can be seen as a contribution to minimize the risk of a single-point-of-failure, but are more a way to bridge organizational boundaries without forcing any organization to give up control of its own information.
We will present some more details on federated identities management when discussing current solutions in the following section.
Privacy
Information privacy in general refers to the claims of individuals that information about themselves should generally not be available to other individuals or organizations, and that, where data is possessed by another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over that data and its use [5] .
One important way to maintain privacy has already been mentioned before: Having different views on your entity in form of different identities. So, using different identifiers already contributes to privacy. When interacting with a service you just provide access to one particular identity. Providing means for defining (service-specific) access rights to the user profile (authorization) also contributes to privacy. However, a single identifier is used for the dynamic views in this case, and services could get information they are not supposed to by combining their knowledge with the knowledge of other services.
In the context of privacy, different levels of identity are distinguished: -veronymous: It is possible to derive the real entity or an entifier from the information in the identity.
-pseudonymous: The identity (identifier) is persistent, i.e. it is used several times to indicate that this is the same person, but it is not possible to derive the entifier from the attributes of the identity.
-anonymous: The identity is only valid for one transaction or page access, it is not possible to derive identifier or entifiers of formerly used identities.
Clarke has coined the term 'nym' to distinguish (id)entifiers for (id)entities from keys referencing to pseudonymous or anonymous user representations: "A 'nym' is one or more data items relating to an (id)entity that are sufficient to distinguish it from other instances of its particular class, but without enabling association with a specific (id)entity" [6] .
The importance of pseudonymous and anonymous identities has been shown in a survey conducted by Ackerman et al. [2] . Respondents were less inclined to provide information when personally identifiable information was requested. In a scenario involving a banking Web site, 58% of respondents said that they would provide information about their income, investments, and investment goals in order to receive customized investment advice. However, only 35% said they would also supply their name and address so that they could receive an investment guide booklet by mail [2, p. 5].
On the technical side the different levels of identity all can be reduced to authorization. The main point in pseudonymous and anonymous identities is concealing user profile attributes or identifiers thus preventing a party from finding out about the real entity or about other identities of the person.
There is an obvious need for mechanisms allowing users to specify and enforce their personal preferences regarding privacy (authorization). In our work on identities management we collected the following requirements for a privacy infrastructure: Online services and businesses could benefit from a powerful, user-centric privacy architecture in identities management because users with less fear of risking their privacy are likely to make more and better personal information available to services [19] .
Existing Identities Management Solutions
Work related to exchanging user profiles and identities management can be found both in product development and research. The solutions can be separated in two basic categories. First, there is work on client based profile management. These infomediary solutions store identity information on the user's computer. Second, there are server based identities management solutions.
Infomediaries
Instead of storing identity information in different services, the information can be stored on the user's computer, and be provided to services when needed. This could lead to higher trust because personal information is located near the user and because the usage of profile information can be controlled and monitored.
Client-side user profile storage is implemented by so-called infomediaries. Infomediaries are (small) applications on the client computer, which manage user profiles and offer services such as automatic fill-in of Web forms or P3P interfaces for exchanging the information with services [7] . Examples for infomediaries are Jotter (www.jotter.com) or Persona (www.persona.com).
The main problem of client-side storage of user profile information is that it is not portable [23] . Personal information stored on one computer (e.g. at work) cannot be easily transferred to another one (e.g. at home or a mobile device). An additional problem with today's infomediaries is that the definition of access rights is possible but far too complex for everyday usage.
Single-Sign-On and Server-based User Profile Databases
While the infomediaries focus on user control of identity information (authorization) server-side solutions are often more service-centered and focus on authentication only. These solutions relate back to multi-server authentication solutions like Kerberos [29] .
In such single-sign-on (SSO) solutions different servers or services share one service to authenticate users.
Today different software vendors offer single-sign-on solutions for Intranets. The solutions are mainly based on (X.500) directory services or are accessible via the LDAP directory access protocol.
While the single-sign-on solutions mentioned before are tailored for Intranet usage, global solutions like DigitalMe from Novell (www.digitalme.com) or Microsoft Passport (www.passport.com) extend this approach to a service for Internet usage [9] . The core of these services is a central user profile directory. Users can store and maintain their personal data in these directory servers via Web interfaces. Services that are certified by the profile storage operator can get access to the authentication and profile information when a user tries to log in at these services.
Microsoft .NET Passport
Passport is the service that made identities management well known. Passport lets you sign up with a minimum of (unverified) personal data: a working email address and a password. So, Passport provides "persistent pseudonyms" -as many as you want. In its pure form passport is just authentication. It does not assert attributes other than the correspondence between identity and email address. The main service it offers is a singlesign-on which provides the authentication for different services. Microsoft is using its market power to propagate Passport by making Passport accounts obligatory for using all Microsoft online services including the Hotmail email service. Therefore, the Passport service currently reports several hundred million accounts and several billion authentications per month.
On the technical side "http redirect" is used for authentication. Thereby, the user's Web browser is redirected from the service to the identity server if no authentication token is present. The identities management system then handles the authentication of the user and sets the authentication token (usually a cookie) that can be used to authenticate the user at further services.
On the privacy side Passport provides an "opt in". You have to give explicit permission to have your profile information shared. However, you do no longer have the chance to control with whom the information is shared when you have opted in nor do you get any indication of how your information is used. Microsoft can forward it to all partners and accept new partners without notifying you.
In addition to the weak privacy Microsoft Passport has been criticized for security problems [21] and lack of privacy considerations. For example, problems with the "http redirect" include potential eavesdropping of the transmission of authentication information and illicit use of stolen authentication tokens.
Liberty Alliance
Even the hundreds of millions accounts in Microsoft Passport look pale beside today's large-scale production authentication systems like Visa and Mastercard.
To allow interoperability, the identities management providers and other companies that are operating these large identification services have joined in the Liberty Alliance to develop a standard for connecting their identification and user profile storage services in a federated way (also see comments on Federated Identities Management in Section 3). More information on the industries viewpoint on federated identity services can be found in [1, 30, 31] .
Currently the Liberty Alliance is working to define an open standard for the representation of identities, the authentication of users and authorizing access to user profile information. The goal is to make it easy for services that are storing user profile information to exchange the information among each other [22] . The idea of the Liberty Alliance is a kind of balance-of-powers notion where all the companies compete to be the customers' first point of contact, whereas the Microsoft approach simply takes it for granted that Microsoft is the primary point of contact (for authentication, at least). The main idea is not to create a platform for sharing personal data, but rather for passing and linking unique identifiers and confirming that they have been authenticated. So, the identities will not be available to all members instantly, but information is forwarded from one member to another, based on bilateral contracts.
Federated identities management standards, like those being produced by the Liberty Alliance, form an "encapsulation layer" over local identity and security environments of diverse domains. This encapsulation layer is what provides interoperability between disparate security systems inside and across domains thus enabling federation. The group of service providers that share linked identities and have business and operating agreements in place is known as a circle of trust (see Figure 2) . The attribute sharing policies within a circle of trust are typically based on:
-a well-defined business agreement between the service providers -user notification of the information being collected -user granting consent for type of information collected.
However, the focus of Liberty Alliance still is on authentication only. There is no real user control in authorization built into the proposal yet.
WS-Federation
In parallel to the efforts of the Liberty Alliance Microsoft and IBM also started to design for federated identities management. Their effort is aligned with their promotion of web services and the development of a security backbone for web services. The first standard, WS-Security, offers mechanisms for attaching security tokens to messages including tokens related to identity. WS-Federation builds on WS-Security and related standards like WS-Trust and defines protocols for identity providers to link user and machine identities to each other for implementing single-sign-on and distribution of user profile attributes.
Profile Information Exchange
Other related work in the commercial field is about exchange and synchronization of user profile information among users or among the applications of one user.
Examples for the replication of user data among users are business card exchange services (see www.cardxchange.net for one example). In these services users can store their contact information (and any additional attributes) and make a subset (view) of this information explicitly available to other users. When the information is changed by the owner the electronic business card changes at all places or the people replicating the information are notified by email. Similar functionality is often built into Community Support platforms.
User-Centric Identities Management
The current solutions presented in Section 4 mainly focus on authentication and not on authorization. They fail to satisfy the needs for a generic user centric identities management solution as proposed in Section 3. In short, the existing systems may provide powerful solutions for making identities accessible, but do not really take into consideration the interest of the identity owner. The distrust issue (see Section 2) is not solved since there is no real control or awareness for the users.
To address the distrust issue, a better orientation towards the identity owner is needed. In particular, this includes adding access right definition (authorization) possibilities and providing awareness and transparency of access.
In the project Cobricks 1 we are piloting an identities management solution, which is clearly focused on user empowerment and supports complex user profile attributes, the IDRepository [16, 17, 18] .
Design requirements
The IDRepository's design addresses the following requirements that were derived from the discussion in Sections 3 and 4:
-separation of user profile storage and user profile usage -federated architecture for user profile storage -user profile information model -trusted attributes in user profiles -user profile owner authorization of profile access -awareness of profile access -focus on usability
In the following paragraphs we will briefly outline what design decisions we have taken for the architecture, for the information model and for authorization to reflect these requirements.
Architecture
Following the idea to separate user profile storage and user profile usage, the core component of our architecture is a user profile repository server (IDRepository) that stores identities and offers the identities' owners and authorized services interfaces to access this information (see Figure 3) . The server offers the functionality to store multiple identities and to link identities to each other. This linking is done by defining data propagation paths, i.e. defining how attributes changed in one identity are propagated to other identities. Each IDRepository server is designed to enable the central storage of identities of several people. At the same time it is possible to have several IDRepository servers for one person, each storing different identities of this person. All the server instances can work together in a federated network. This network of IDRepository servers can also be a sub-network in a larger set of Liberty Alliance nodes. Using the Liberty Alliance circle of trust concept the IDRepository nodes can forward information to non-IDRepository nodes if these fulfill some basic requirements towards user centric identities management. Figure 4 shows the setup of several IDRepository servers storing identities of one user. The figure highlights two additional features of IDRepository: 1) Identities stored on one or more servers can be linked (by defining data propagation paths). Such a link will make sure that changes to selected attributes in one profile will be forwarded automatically to the linked profiles. This offers an alternative to having one profile with different views defined by access rights, and makes it possible to define different identities that cannot be easily mapped to the same person by external watchers. 2) Services may cache information retrieved from the IDRepository network. To keep these cached copies of the user profiles up to date the IDRepository provides update notifications to services caching information. 
Certification of Attributes
Since attributes can be set by different sources there has to be meta data associated to them, e.g. who last modified an attribute. In addition to knowing who has written a particular piece of information, it might be necessary to have a means to verify this transaction. If attributes are to be used for one application only, the service could store these attributes locally (and only store the other attributes globally in the identity management service) -but there are scenarios where attributes should be exchanged among services and still have to be trusted (e.g. attribute that user has bought for more that US$1000 at one e-commerce site which entitles her for special discounts in other services). For this purpose the IDRepository servers offer the functionality to sign any sub-hierarchy or subset of attributes in the repository and store the signatures. Anybody then can check the origin and the integrity.
Authorization
Authorization or access control has to address the issue of what platform should be provided with what type of information (to do personalization), and which users should be able to see what information (for matchmaking and trust building).
As we have discussed in Section 3, authorization in identities management has to support flexibility, arbitrary level of detail and granularity, purpose binding of requests and dependency on the privacy policy of a service. In addition to the primary access control, control over sharing and distribution of data has to be provided (again based on the privacy policy of a service).
Traditional access control systems, such as role-or group-based solutions do not sufficiently support these requirements (see [25, 26] for an overview of traditional access control systems). With these solutions it is not possible to deal properly with unknown services by making the access decision dependent on the privacy policy of the service or the purpose of the access.
The IDRepository approach suggests a two-step access-token based approach that was developed from P3P ideas [35] . In the first step the access requests are exchanged and negotiated (possibly with the participation of the profile owner). The result of the step is the transmission of an XML based access ticket to the requesting service. The access ticket contains information about the granted access rights (including the contexts under which the access rights might be exercised. Using the access ticket the service than can efficiently request the information from the IDRepository. See [33, 34, 35] for more information on the access control scheme used in the IDRepository.
The access token solution addresses the issue of controlling which information should be provided to which platform. For the second aspect of access control (controlling access to information by other users on the platforms that were allowed to store copies) we have developed a rule-based approach. The user (with the help of tools and standard rule-sets) can define rules for which of her information other users can see. These rules can depend on any attributes in the identities of the requesting users and of the requested user. Using different functions on the profile attributes it is also possible to allow access to user profile attributes in different levels of detail instead of just denying access. This is for example used for determining how detailed other users can see a per-son's current location in location aware systems. Being part of the profile (as meta data of user profile attributes) the rules are distributed whenever the user profile is replicated.
Limitations of User-Centric Identities Management
At a first glance there are no drawbacks of the user-centric identities management concept. It surely is in the interest of the user, will build up trust in identities management solutions, and thereby will increase the usefulness of such solutions. Additionally, usercentric identities management also provides new business possibilities for services providing trusted hosting of identities.
The main limitation of the user-centric identities management concept is, however, that user control can be exercised properly only when appropriate user interfaces for defining and managing the various access rights exist.
There already has been some work on user interfaces for identities management (see for example [12] or [15] ). We are currently building on this work and are employing it to the IDRepository described before. More precisely, we are working on solutions for supporting the users in defining access rights for other platforms and for other users. In the following we will present some ideas of how this can be done.
For defining access rights for other platforms there is already some work from the P3P project of the World Wide Web Consortium. In this context the APPEL language was developed to express user privacy preferences that can automatically matched with the privacy declarations of requesting services. However, APPEL was not designed for nonexpert users. The same is true for a powerful rule language we have developed for defining access rights for other users.
We are currently providing pre-defined sets of rules in both cases, to make the functionality available for non-expert users. That means that we have compiled sets of rules that serve particular purposes (e.g. full privacy for all attributes, public visibility for name and email address), and make them available to the users to select from. We are still working on determining what sets of rules are needed by the users. In this context we are also working on means for distributing the provision of such presets among different providers, so that the users can select presets from their trusted providers.
When looking into "real-world" identities management, i.e. how people manage what they reveal to other people in direct encounter, one can identify the issue of "awareness" as an important feature. People are aware of what information other people receive about themselves, and can directly react on the information -both in dialogs and in shaping their presence as a whole. Hence, one important feature of electronic identities management systems might be to provide awareness -Awareness of what is revealed to others and awareness of who currently is conscious of which information.
Providing this awareness in a way that is manageable by the users will be an important issue in future works on user interfaces for identities management. We are currently working on extending the broad body of work on awareness issues in computer supported cooperative work in this direction. This includes employing different means for visualizing the information gathered in the identities management network to be consumed in a peripheral way.
Summary and Conclusions
The availability of identity information for user representation will be important for future Internet based e-commerce and collaboration applications. Information about users is needed for performing transactions, for providing personalized services, and for presenting users to each other.
Identities management and central user profile repositories might help -to motivate users to make user profile information available (because they have control and awareness about who is using it), and -to enable services to provide effective personalization without cold-start problems.
These two effects could help to boost the use of personalization in online services.
Ultimate benefit of activities like Microsoft Passport or the Liberty Alliance project will be to make authentication and data sharing practices open and visible. The review of the market development shows that federated identities management solutions will soon become a market standard for enabling e-business and e-collaboration.
However, to gain trust from the profile owners a solution has to clearly support -definition and handling of different access rights and/or sub-identities -provision of awareness of access to the profile information
The functionality has to be provided in an intuitive way and has to cover the emerging mobile applications that also need user profile information for performing their services. Therefore, different (trusted) operators for identity management servers are needed from which users can choose.
The IDRepository presented in this paper extends the possibilities of these solutions by providing user centric identities management while preserving interoperability with emerging networks wherever possible.
There are still some challenges to be addressed. From the technical point of view the most important issues are:
-how to specify (and enforce) access rights (especially including usability and user interface issues), and -how to represent user profile data to make it usable by different services.
Another challenge that cannot be solved through technology alone is the issue of access right enforcement. As already discussed in the P3P project of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) a certification of services is needed to ensure that the services make correct statements about their privacy policy. An issue linked with the service certification is the selection of a trusted operator for the identities management service. Different options have to be available for this choice. In this context the question of business models for future identities management providers has to be addressed. First ideas for such business models are drawing from analogies of "user profile banks" with classical banks that have gained trust and are providing access to money from everywhere.
When this issue is solved we can also extend the scope of central identities management solutions to appliances, i.e. to have personal appliances load user profile information for personalization from the central repositories.
